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Abstract
Thispapermodelscorruptionasoptimalparasitisminorganizationswhere
teams of agents are weakly restrained by principals. Each agent takes on part
of the role of principal, choosing how much to invest in policing to repress
corruptioninothersandhowrapaciouslytoact whenunpolicedopportunities
arise. This simple model incorporates most of the factors stressed in empir-
ical analyses of corruption, and gives rise to a wide variety of equilibria.
Allow income to co-evolve with corruption, we show how adding corrup-
tion to a textbook exogenous growth model leads to a Lucas paradox. When
incomeandcorruptionaect each othersucientlystrongly,economiescon-
verge to two corner equilibria despite diminishing returns to capital: a rich,
clean corner and a poor, corrupt one; a pattern that appears to characterize
international data.
1 Introduction.
To the fundamental question Why are we so rich, and they so poor? is increas-
ingly given the answer Because we have good institutions, and they bad ones.
While the quality of institutions has moved to the centre of the empirical growth
literature, less attention has been given to formal models of what determines this
quality.
The obvious way for economists to understand the quality of institutions is
through principal-agent models, where senior bureaucrats as agents choose how
This paper is part of the International Trade and Investment Programme of the Geary Institute at
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1conscientiously to act in response to the monitoring and incentives that they face.
The problem in applying a principal-agent model to bureaucracies however is that
there is often no obvious principal: most bureaucracies operate with little external
monitoring. In the absence of eective principals then, what determines the qual-
ity of a country's institutions, and indeed how does any country manage to have
institutions better than Nigeria's?
The basic idea of this paper is that agents in teams who are weakly controlled
by a principal will each take on some of the role of the principal and police each
other's behaviour. The degree of policing and the rapacity of agents when unpoli-
cied opportunities present themselves determine the quality of the institution. Just
as decentralized markets are ordered through the invisible hand of the price mecha-
nism, so decentralized organisations are ordered through the invisible st of mutual
policing.
Corruption in organisations is analogous to parasitism in animals. A central
question in parasitology is what restrains the virulence of unrelated parasites. The
answer, and the motivation for the analysis here, is mutual policing: each unit can
benet by devoting resources to reducing the rapacity of its neighbours (Frank,
1995).
Our model is very simple. Each agent invests eort pi to policing other agents.
An average policing level of p means that each bureaucrat must devote a fraction p
of his time to doing his job and can devote his remaining time to being dishonest.
During the fraction 1  p of the time when unpoliced opportunities occur the agent
must choose ri, how rapaciously to act. Rapacity can range from looking out the
window to grand larceny. The amount of corruption reects how much time each
agent devotes to dishonesty and with what intensity: c = (1  p)r.
Policing at intensity pi costs the agent C(pi). The bureaucrat gets a return
D(ri) from unpoliced activities and may have self-restraint that imposes a cost S(ri)
on rapacity. Any loss of institutional eciency from corruption imposes a cost
of E(c) on the agent through pressure from principals, loyalty to the institution,
or fear of competing institutions. Given these costs and returns, the individual
chooses optimal levels of policing and rapacity. This simple model can incorporate
most of the factors included in informal analyses of corruption: colonial and legal
2origins, education, the curse of natural resources, competitive entry and formal
career ladders, democracy, and press freedom.
Section 3 shows that the resulting equilibrium can be an internal one with in-
termediate levels of policing and rapacity; a corner with zero policing and low
rapacity; or a corner with high rapacity repressed by heavy policing. Section 4
shows how the model can explain how corruption evolves through time, in par-
ticular the gradual fall of corruption in developed economies; and its rapid rise in
former-colonial and Soviet economies.
Section 5allowscorruption andincome to co-evolve. Itshowsthat ifcorruption
and income exert a suciently strong eect on each other, economies fall into
two basins of attraction: one converging on a high income, low corruption steady
state, the other converging to a low income, high corruption steady state. In other
words, adding corruption to a standard Solow-Ramsey growth equation leads to a
Lucas paradox: high and low income economies co-exist despite monotonically
diminishing returns to capital. Section 6 nds that in international data, income
and institutional quality appear to fall into two clusters, consistent with two basins
of attraction.
2 Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?
In this section we develop a simple model of the behaviour of senior bureaucrats.
Each chooses how much eort pi to invest in policing other agents, and how rapa-
ciously to act ri when an unpoliced opportunity presents itself.
Policing here serves to deter corruption rather than to punish it.1 If the aver-
age policing level of other agents is p i, the agent can engage in dishonest activi-
ties a fraction 1  p i of the time. Policing involves not only direct monitoring of
colleagues and subordinates but also developing and implementing better ways to
control and audit activity.
1Policing here is exactly analogous to repairing fences among Ellickson's (1986) Shasta County
ranchers. Because policing deters corruption in others it has an immediate payo, in contrast to
punishment which requires costly actionafter someone has broken the rules, leading to second-order
free rider problems (Panchanathan and Boyd, 2004).
3Topolice others withaneectiveness pi costs theagentC(pi)withCp >0;Cpp >
0;C(0) = 0. The cost of policing reects the characteristics of individuals, and the
norms and structures of the institutions in which they operate. Rauch and Evans
(2000) nd that the performance of bureaucracies is strongly predicted by the ex-
tent to which they are Weberian: having open, competitive appointments and
promotions through a clearly dened hierarchy. Career bureaucrats who have
risen through the system through demonstrated ability and loyalty to institututional
norms will be able to police more eectively than political appointees. Other fac-
tors aecting policing costs are the educational level of bureaucrats, the level of
organizational technology, and, if diering legal systems require dierent degrees
of procedural formalism, the origin of the legal code (La Porta et al., 1999).
An agent who exploits an opportunity for dishonesty with rapacity ri receives
a payo of D(ri) with Dr > 0;Drr < 0;D(0) = 0. Several factors considered in the
empirical literature increase the payo to dishonesty D: low salaries, and eco-
nomic circumstances conducive to soliciting generous bribes or diverting funds for
personal use: multilateral aid, big government, or the curse of natural resources
(Ades and Di Tella 1999, Leite and Weidmann 2002).
The professionalism of bureaucrats not only aects how much they restrain the
rapacity of each other, but how much they restrain their own rapacity. We suppose
that exercising rapacity of ri imposes a cost S(ri) on the agent where S r  0;S rr 
0;S(0) = 0. What we call self-restraint resembles motivation in Besley and Ghatak
(2004).
Finally, the average degree of corruption c = (1  p)r imposes a loss of E(c)
on the bureaucrat where Ec > 0;Ecc > 0;E(0) = 0. Losses reect pressures from
two sources: externally from the public, and internally from loyalty to the insti-
tution and fear of rival institutions. External pressure reects the extent to which
public dissatisfaction with low performance imposes costs on bureaucracy, in other
words, the eectiveness of political agency. Societies with eective democracy
and press freedom are more able to make life uncomfortable for corrupt bureau-
crats than authoritarian ones (Adsera, Boix and Payne 2003, Besley and Prat 2004,
Shleifer and Vishny 1993, Treisman 2000). The democracy and openness of so-
cieties reect, in part at least, their historical evolution (Acemoglu, Johnson and
4Robinson 2004, Engerman and Sokolo 2005) and their levels of education and
income (Glaeser et al 2004).
Personal loyalty to institution and colleagues aside, internal pressure reects
competition from other institutions: nothing generates altruism like fear of a com-
mon enemy. Rodger (2004) shows how Britain's drive to develop better institu-
tions, particularly its navy, after the sixteenth century came from its fear of defeat
by richer and more populous Catholic neighbours. Similarly, what distinguishes
South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan from the Philippines and Indonesia, is this
sense of relentless competition with a potentially dangerous neighbour.
Most fundamentally, Berman (1983) argues that competition explains why for-
mal institutions exist in the rst place. Asking why rulers in the West, in contrast
to China and Islam, came to limit their powers by recognising explicit laws and
the jurisdiction of autonomous institutions, he argues that the essential factor in
European legal development was the competition for resources between state and
church starting in the eleventh century. Each was led each to develop explicit rules
to improve its own competitiveness and, eventually, to recognise the legitimacy of
the other.
We suppose that the individual's payo V is the sum of the returns to unpoliced
rapacity minus the cost of individual policing and rapacity, and the loss due to
systemic ineciency caused by corruption:





The model has one period: reputation building, punishment and other features
of repeated games will play no role here. There are N senior bureaucrats. Each
chooses a level of policing pi and rapacity ri to maximize V.2 Dierentiating V
with respect to rapacity ri and recognising that agents are identical so pi = p and
2Concavity of V requires that @2V=@r2
i = (1   p i)Drr   S rr   (1   p)22Ec < 0;@2V=@p2
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requires that Err;S rr;Cpp be large relative to  and Ecc.
5ri = r, gives the rst order condition that the marginal cost of rapacity equals its
marginal benet
(1  p)Dr = S r+(1  p)Ec (2)
where  = 1=N is the impact of individual on average actions. At a given level
of policing, (2) implies that rapacity will be increasing in the marginal return to
dishonesty Dr, and diminishing in individual inuence , marginal self-restraint
S r, and personal cost of systemic corruption Ec.
Similarly agents choose a level of policing 0  pi  ¯ p. The maximum level of
policing ¯ p < 1 so that opportunities for corruption are never entirely eliminated.
(This eliminates problems with 1  p terms in denominators when S is positive.)
For a level of policing in the interior of the range, the agent equates marginal cost
and benet
Cp = rEc: (3)
Bureaucrats police each other only when perceived eciency losses from corrup-
tion Ec are positive.
At the p = 0 corner the marginal cost of policing can exceed its benet Cp 
rEc, and conversely at the maximum policing corner ¯ p. For a given level of
rapacity r, policing is increasing in marginal personal loss from corruption Ec and
individual inuence , and diminishing in marginal policing cost Cp.
The combination of r and p satisfying the rst order condition for rapacity (2)
is termed the RR curve. This has slope
dr
dp
    
RR
=
(1  p)rEcc  S r=(1  p)
S rr (1  p)Drr+(1  p)2Ecc
: (4)
Because the denominator is positive, the slope depends on the sign of the numer-
ator. For zero marginal self-restraint S r = 0 the numerator is positive everywhere.
Otherwise it rst rises and then falls as self restraint S r asserts itself, reaching a
maximum at p = 1 (S r=rEcc)1=2 which is increasing in individual inuence 
and convexity of loss to eciency Ecc, and decreasing in marginal self restraint S r.
The intercept at p = 0, where rapacity is unrestrained by policing, occurs where
Dr = S r +Ec(r). This intercept rises with the marginal return to dishonesty Dr,
6and diminishing in , marginal self-restraint S r, and the marginal cost of systemic
ineciency due to corruption Ec. For values of r above the RR curve, Vr <0 giving
an incentive to reduce rapacity.
The combinations of r and p satisfying the rst order condition for policing (3)
are called the PP curve. This has slope
dr
dp






which is everywhere positive. The zero policing intercept occurs where Cp(0) =
rEc(r) which is increasing in marginal cost of policing, and diminishing in  and
perceived eciency loss Ec. For policing levels below the PP curve Vp is negative
so the individual has an incentive to reduce policing.
For example, suppose that the payo to dishonesty D=dr
1=2
i , the cost of polic-
ing C = c0pi +c1p2
i , the degree of self restraint S = sr2
i , and the cost of systemic













The policing and rapacity curves give rise to the taxonomy of equilibria shown in
Figure 1. In the rst case the policing curve lies above the rapacity curve. This
reects low returns to dishonesty Dr, small numbers of senior bureaucrats leading
to large , and, possibly, high self-restraint S r, combined with high marginal cost
of policing Cp. The resulting equilibrium, at point A in the rst panel of Figure 1,
has zero policing and relatively low rapacity. This equilibrium, which resembles
eighteenth century England, we refer to as Old Corruption.
The opposite case occurs in the second panel of Figure 1 where the policing






















Figure 1: Equilibrium policing and rapacity. (a) Old corruption. (b) Hobbesian.
(c) Internal equilibrium. (d) Saddle path stable.
Dr and low self restraint S r meet a low cost of policing Cp. At the equilibrium
point B, strong rapacity is repressed by strong policing. The harsh view of human
nature underlying this equilibrium leads to its label Hobbesian.
After the two corner solutions in the rst two panels, the third panel shows a
stable interior solution where the rapacity curve intersects the policing curve from
above at point C. This requires the high returns to dishonesty Dr and low marginal
policing cost Cp(0) of the Hobbesian regime so that the rapacity curve starts above
the policing curve.
The curves in this case can intersect either at low policing or high policing. The
low policing intersection requires a steep policing PP curve (resulting from a rapid
8increase in the marginal cost of policing) leading to an outcome with low policing
and high rapacity. The high policing equilibrium occurs when a at policing curve
(marginal cost of policing starts low and stays low) intersects the downward slop-
ing part of the rapacity curve associated with high self restraint S r. This regime
matches Weber's ideal bureaucracy where conscientious ocials intensively re-
strain themselves and each other.
The last possibility, shown in the fourth panel of Figure 1, is where the policing
curve intersects the rapacity curve from above. The intersection point is saddle
path stable so the r-p space is divided into two basins of attraction, one going
towards the Old Corruption equilibrium D, the other going towards the Hobbesian
equilibrium E.
The curves may, of course, intersect more than once. For example, when the
policing curve intersects the rapacity curve rst from above and then below, the
outcome will be a stable equilibrium at the second, higher policing intersection,
while the lower intersection is saddle path stable, falling towards either the higher
internal equilibrium, or the Old Corruption corner.
We can view the equilibrium in two ways, either as Nash where each agent
immediately jumps to his optimum, or as evolutionarily stable where less intelli-
gent agents start at some level of policing and rapacity pi;ri and then grope in the
direction of higher payos. These views of equilibrium are equivalent here but, in
Section 5 when income and corruption jointly evolve through time, we shall stress
the evolutionary interpretation.
4 Institutions evolving.
Equilibrium corruption changes as the policing and rapacity curves shift. A down-
ward shift of the policing curve along a xed rapacity curve, as a result of a fall
in marginal cost of policing Cp for example, will increase policing. Along upward
sloping sections of the rapacity curves (typically at low p) this downward shift in
policing induces rapacity to rise, and conversely on downward sloping sections.
Downward shifts in rapacity, caused by falls in the marginal returns to dishonesty









Figure 2: Evolution of corruption in industrialized economies: Falling rapacity and
rising policing.
The level of corruption is c = (1  p)r making the proportional change in cor-
ruption approximately dc=c = dr dp=(1  p). Falls in rapacity reduce corruption
markedly at low levels of policing p, but matter less at high levels when changes in
policing dominate. Consequently, at a low policing equilibrium where the curves
intersect along a rising part of the rapacity curve, a rise in policing can increasee
equilibrium corruption c; as can a reduction in rapacity at high policing levels.
Rises in concentration ofpower and and in perceived losses caused by corrup-
tion Ec shift both curves downward, and, by reducing the net payo to corruption
V, cause equilibrium corruption to fall.
These curves allow a straightforward analysis of the gradual fall in corruption
in developed economies; and the sudden rise of corruption in former colonial and
post-Soviet states.
4.1 The waning of old corruption.
Industrialized economies have not always enjoyed high quality institutions. The
British system of government before the 1830s is remembered as Old Corrup-
tion, that of the US before the 1880s as the spoils system. In both cases, re-







Figure 3: Evolution of corruption in ex-colonial and former Soviet economies:
rapacity no longer repressed by intensive policing.
pointees to salaried professionals recruited and promoted on a meritocratic ba-
sis. In the US this change centres on the Pendleton Civil Service Reform Act of
1883 (Hoogenboom, 1961) whereas the British process was more gradual(Harling,
1996).
Replacing temporary appointees loyal to their political patrons with compet-
itively recruited professional bureaucrats loyal to the institution lowers policing
costs Cp and Cpp, and increases self restraint S r and aversion to corruption Ec.
Paying regular salaries and linking promotion to performance lowers relative re-
turns to dishonesty Dr. The result is that both policing and rapacity curves shift
downwards. Falls in Cpp, the rate at which marginal cost of policing rises, cause
the policing curve to atten, while rising self-restraint S r causes the rapacity curve
to start sloping downwards at a lower policing level p.
The evolution of institutional quality in developed economies is shown in the
rst panel of Figure 2. The policing and rapacity curves shift down from PP1, RR1
to PP2, RR2, causing rapacity to fall and policing to rise from A1 to A2.
114.2 Post-colonial corruption.
Studies of institutions (Ellickson 1986, Greif 1993 or North 1990, for example)
are drawn to success stories. The analysis here applies equally to failures, most
notably the rise in corruption in post-colonial and post-Soviet economies.
In colonial administrations a small number of colonists hold high positions and
supervise natives in low positions. A colonial system therefore entails two sets
of bureaucrats with payos Vc for colonists, Vn for natives. Corruption is now a
weighted average of the corruption of each group c=(1 pc)rc+(1 )(1 pn)rn
where  is the share of resources controlled by each group.
To the extent that native bureaucrats have low status, low education, and low
attachment to colonial institutions, they will have a high marginal cost of policing
Cn
p and see little personal loss En
c from systemic ineciency. From the rst order
condition (3), their policing will be negligible, and all policing will be undertaken
by the colonists. At the same time, low self-restraint S n
r reecting the absence of a
belief in the legitimacy of the colonial government, and high returns to dishonesty
Dn
r from poor pay and promotional prospects will result in a high rapacity locus.
For colonial administrators the marginal costs of policing natives is likely to be
low: solicitude for subordinates or qualms about wrongly punishing the innocent
are likely to lower than at home. The outcome shown in the second panel of Figure
3 is a Hobbesian equilibrium at B1 where high rapacity by native bureaucrats is
restrained by vigorous policing by colonial administrators.
At independence, natives take over the senior positions held by colonists. If
they retain their original rapacity but incur higher policing costs than colonial ad-
ministrators, the policing curve will shift along the rapacity locus to B2. Rapacity
remains high but policing falls, causing corruption to rise. A similar story can be
told for the Soviet Union in its declining years where high rapacity fed by cynicism
about the regime was kept in check by tough policing which disappeared with the
collapse of communism.
This analysis shows what precisely is bad about the bad institutions that Ace-
moglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) argue were left behind by colonizers in
places with low European life expectancy. Long established, elaborately organized
colonial bureaucracies gave natives opportunities to acquire the skills and outlook
12of senior bureaucrats. Independence in India or Ireland meant leaving government
in the hands of natives whose levels of education and probity were at least as those
of the colonial administrators, whereas in Africa it meant giving power to army
sergeants.
5 Co-evolution of Income and Institutions.
Income so far has been exogenous. We now look at what happens when income
and institutional quality evolve together.
To keep our analysis in two dimensions after adding income, we fold the two
institutional quality variables, policing and rapacity, into a single corruption vari-
able. We assume that rises in income, and concomitant improvements in education
and organizational ability, reduce corruption by shifting down the policing and ra-
pacity curves in the manner of Section 4.1.3 Adjustment to a new steady state
occurs gradually rather than instantaneously: we assume an evolutionarily stable
adjustment of bureaucratic behaviour rather than instantaneous Nash jumps. Let-







We suppose that fy < 0, income improves institutions; gc < 0, corruption retards
growth; and fc < 0, gy < 0 so that corruption and income converge to steady states.








3Allowing more elaborate eects, such as a corruption Kuznets curve due, for instance, to the
curse of natural resources, can add some steady states but will not change the analysis materially.
Empirically, there is a strongly monotonic relationship between income and institutional quality, as
Figure 5 below shows.
13c
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Figure 4: Co-evolution of income and corruption. (a) Income dominates (b) Stable
interior solution: weak interaction between income and corruption: cy > yc.
(c) Corner solutions: strong interaction between income and corruption: cy <
yc
In other words, we are simply adding corruption to a standard Solow-Ramsey ex-
ogenous growth model4
The three strands of the tropical underdevelopment literature reect dierent
beliefs about the relative magnitude of these coecients. The institutions rule ap-
proach of Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001), Engerman and Sokolo (2005)
and others argues that the impact of institutions on growth c is large, and that, be-
cause the quality of institutions largely reects history, y is small. The institutions
reect income approach of Glaeser et al. (2004) implies that causality ows from
income to institutions so y is large and c is small. In the geography matters ap-
proach of Sachs (2001) c is negligible so equilibrium income is y0=y where y0
reects the geographical endowment of the country.
In biological terms, the set of equations (6)represents corruption and income as
two species competing for the same resources. It has 3 possible equilibria depicted
in Figure 4. In the rst, the isoclines do not intersect and the system tends to a
zero corruption equilibrium (if the corruption isocline lies below the income one
as shown) or zero income (if the income isocline is lower). Otherwise, the isoclines













4Ehrlich and Lui (1999) add corruption to a considerably more complex endogenous growth
model.
14The equilibrium then depends onwhich isocline issteeper. Theincome isocline
is steeper when c=y > c=y. The intersection c;y is then globally stable as
shown in the second panel of Figure 4.
Conversely, when c=y < c=y the intersection c;y is saddle-path stable.
The saddle path divides the diagram into two basins of attraction, one converging
to wealth and probity at D; the other to poverty and malfeasance at C.
Given the convergence rates c;y of corruption and income, whether the in-
ternal equilibium is globally stable or saddle path stable depends on the size of
the cross eect terms between income and corruption. If the product of the cross
eects cy is small: institutions do not matter and/or income does not aect insti-
tutional quality, the interior equilibrium is globally stable. All countries will have
middling levels of corruption and income, with dierences reecting their dier-
ent values of c0 and y0. Conversely, when one or both of the cross eects between
income and corruption are large, two groups of countries emerge: rich, clean ones
and poor, corrupt ones.
When the cross eects are large then, we have a simple answer to Lucas's
(1990) question Why doesn't capital ow from rich to poor countries? Despite
growth's following a standard Solow-Ramsey model without any regions of in-
creasing marginal product of capital economies fall into two steady states: those
with high income and low corruption, and those with low income and high corrup-
tion.
This simple model can incorporate the Great Divergence, the fact that in-
comes before 1800 were more equal than they are now. In a pre-industrial world
where agriculture dominates output there is little scope for institutions to aect
output. As a consequence c is small economies converge on an interior steady
state. With the growing complexity of economic activity associated with industri-
alization, the ability of institutions to mess up economies increases. c rises and
generates two corner equilibria with fortunate economies converging to the high
income corner, and unfortunate ones pulled to the high corruption one.

























































































Figure 5: Clustering in income and institutional quality.
6 Cluster Analysis.
The divergence of economies into two corner equilibria when the cross eects in
equation (6) are suciently strong raises the question of how large these coef-
cients really are. Attempting to estimate (6) directly is problematic. Even if
the coecients of a cross section growth regression can be meaningfully estimated
(Durlauf and Quah,1999), itishard tondsuitable instruments, oreven tomeasure
the level and growth of corruption. Corruption indices of the sort put together by
IRIS or Transparency International are essentially ordinal. If a country's Corrup-
tion Perceptions Index improves from 2 to 3, we can conclude that its institutions
have improved somewhat, but not that they are fty percent better.
Our approach is to look for clusters in the distribution of income and corrup-
tion. If corruption and income levels fall into a single cluster, we can conclude








































































Figure 6: (a) Classication uncertainty. Large circles denote observations above
the 95 percentile, open circles observations in the 7595 percentile. (b) Contour
plot of density of observations.
that there are weak cross eects in (6), while the appearance of two clusters is
consistent with strong cross eects.
To identify groups of related observations in the data we use the model-based
clustering approach of Fraley and Raftery (2002b). Each of the k clusters in the
data has a multivariate normal distribution with mean k and covariance k. Co-
variance matrices are parametrized through an eigenvalue decomposition, and the
number of clusters and class of covariance matrix are chosen through a Bayesian
Information Criterion approximation of the classication likelihood function.
Figure 4 plots per capita GDP from the Penn World Tables 6.1 against the
Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (where higher scores cor-
respond to lower corruption), both for 2000.5 Using the Mclust algorithm (Fraley
and Raftery 2002a), for the data in Figure 4, the Bayesian Information Criterion is
maximised with two clusters that have equal, ellipsoidal covariance matrices. The
high income, low corruption cluster, depicted by triangles, centres on Germany and
5There are data available in both series for 83 countries. Luxembourg, which is a strong outlier
for income, was excluded to make the scatterplots clearer. Including Luxembourg did not change the
results of the cluster algorithm.
17Austria; the low income, high corruption cluster, depicted by squares, centres on
Bulgaria, Colombia and Turkey.
For each country we can estimate the uncertainty of its classication by sub-
tracting the probability of the most likely group for each observation from 1. Only
three observations have classication uncertainty above4percent: Slovenia (0.497),
Portugal (0.227) and Greece (0.120). The left hand panel of Figure 6 shows the un-
certainty associated with each observation. The right hand panel gives a contour
plot, showing the density of observations around the twin peaks.
7 Conclusions.
Just as animals suer from parasitism, so do institutions, and that parasitism is
called corruption. This paper used insights from parasitology to look at how senior
bureaucrats behave when weakly controlled by principals and showed that each
will, in part, adopt the role of principal and police his peers and his won rapacity.
We found that dierent regimes can lead to very dierent levels of policing and
rapacity. Looking then at how corruption and income evolve together we saw that,
if the interactions between them are suciently strong, a standard Solow-Ramsey
model leads to a world of rich, well run countries, and poor, misgoverned ones.
The goal throughout was to work with extremely simple models, stripping the
analysis down to its logical essentials. Anything beyond policing and rapacity that
could be put into a black box was put into one. The natural continuation of this
paper is to look more deeply at the organization of the bureaucracy in the manner
of Besley and Ghatak (2004); and to explicitly add politicians and the public to the
analysis in the manner of Banerjee (1997) and Alesina and Angeletos (2005).
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